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May 2003
Economics, Biology, and Culture: Hodgson on History ∗
by
Alexander J. Field
Department of Economics
Santa Clara University
Santa Clara, CA 95053
email: afield@scu.edu

This book addresses what the author claims, with considerable justification, to be the
foremost challenge confronting the social and behavioral sciences today: the problem of
historical specificity. Hodgson poses the question by asking whether we need different
theories to understand social and economic behavior in different societies at different
stages of their development. He answers the question in the affirmative, and criticizes the
economics profession for suggesting that there is one universal model or theory equally
suited to all economies and societies at all times. He faults the profession further for no
longer worrying much or conducting serious debate about this issue, a development he
attributes to the eclipse and eventual demise of institutionalism and historical economics
in England, Germany, and the United States.
The book is most provocative as a contribution to intellectual history. Hodgson
acknowledges that “the key methodological problem, of the relationship between the
individual and society, dogged the historical school for its entire existence and was never
satisfactorily resolved” (p. 64). On the other hand, he rejects the notion that
institutionalism and historical economics died in the face of superior, more compelling
evidence or arguments. He attributes the loss of influence to a set of particular political
and historical events that might have been different. In a nutshell, these schools of
thought died because of idiosyncratic developments at Harvard University and the
London School of Economics, combined with the intellectual evisceration of German
universities with the rise of fascism. The final nail in the coffin was the triumph of
Keynesianism at Harvard and Cambridge: Keynes’ work was almost completely devoid
of any concern for the problem (while true, the sin seems far less egregious than in the
case of Robbins 1 ). Post-Keynesians, in continuing to aspire to a “General Theory”, have
done no better.

∗

A review essay on How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical Specificity in Social
Science, by Geoffrey Hodgson. London: Routledge, 2001. The essay appears in Research in Economic
Thought and Methodology vol. 22A, eds. Warren J. Samuels and Jeff E. Biddle. Amsterdam: Elsevier,
2004, pp. 373-98. Comments by David Colander, Herbert Gintis, Michael Kevane, John McMillan, Bill
Sundstrom, and Gavin Wright are gratefully acknowledged.
1
Lionel Robbins was remarkably cavalier in his discussions of the relevance of evidence in developing or
testing economic theory. See Robbins (1932 [1984], pp. 78-79).
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This is an ambitious work. In the process of looking backward, it raises a number of
important issues relevant to how we should conduct social and economic inquiry in the
future. The last part of Hodgson’s book, however, which tries to lay out an agenda for
such research, is, by the author’s acknowledgement, the least satisfactory (p. 273). In
spite of all his critical efforts, he seems unable to delineate a compelling vision of how
research in institutional economics, or in the behavioral sciences more generally, should
now be conducted.
Thus the central puzzle posed by this book. Why does his scholarship, and other
scholarship in this tradition, not break open new vistas? Why is it unlikely to be
successful in overcoming the malaise of many social scientists, both within and outside of
economics, who recognize the potentially independent influence of culture, social
structure, or institutional rules on behavior, but seem unable to enunciate a research
program that goes beyond on the one hand description of such influences, and on the
other hand periodic attacks on the “neoclassical” or rational choice orthodoxy?
My intent in the remainder of this essay is to explore why Hodgson, and so many others
of both heterodox and orthodox persuasions, continue to confront such difficulty in
moving forward. Perhaps there is only so far this style of intellectual history can take us
in advancing social science. Perhaps also it has become too easy to settle into well
established (and largely justified) critiques of rational choice theory as it is actually
practiced. Getting into the rhythm of these critiques can feel like putting on a set of well
worn clothes. It’s an easy thing to do because they’re probably right where we put them
down last night.
But if we continue to wear the same outfits day after day, there begins to be a downside.
When we no longer innovate, our sartorial displays cease inspiring enthusiasm in those
who observe them and ultimately in ourselves as well. I am not recommending shopping
for its own sake – our consumerist society contains enough exhortations to this end
already. But, if I may now extract myself from this metaphor, we do need new
approaches, because as social scientists, we are making relatively little scientific progress
in developing robust predictive models of human behavior. Hodgson obviously very
much wants to provide that intellectual leadership. But although this is original
scholarship, one puts it down with the sense that it could have been written in the 1960s
or 1970s, perhaps even earlier.
Well, what of it? In some areas of scholarship, such as political theory or philosophy, it
still makes sense to start with texts written hundreds or even thousands of years ago. At
the same time, it is quite evident that in areas of the natural sciences such as chemistry
and biology, we have made remarkable explanatory and predictive breakthroughs in
recent centuries and decades. To say of a recently published book in these fields that it
has a certain nineteenth century feel to it would not be to praise it.
Some will rationalize the current state of affairs by asking whether the study of human
behavior can or should be a progressive scientific endeavor. Ariel Rubinstein, for
example, has argued that economic theory simply should not be “a tool for predicting or
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describing real human behavior”. As to what makes a “good” economic model, intuition
should suffice as an evaluative criterion: if it’s good enough for philosophy, it ought to
be good enough for economic theory (2001, p. 616). I find this position unacceptable and
believe Hodgson does as well.
Most of us work in divisions of social or behavioral sciences, not divisions of social
philosophy. We are supposed to be doing science. Rubinstein has the courage to
acknowledge weaknesses in the record of game theory, for example, in actually
illuminating human interaction. The problem, of course, is more general. The social and
behavioral sciences, by which I mean principally economics, sociology, anthropology,
political science, and psychology, do not, either individually or collectively, have a good
recent track record on this account. Balkanized, and recapitulating some of the same
debates again and again, in many respects social science discourse is enervated and, to
those who read it, enervating. This is as true of work in institutional economics or
traditional sociology or anthropology as it is in those who favor rational choice
approaches. 2
Rubinstein’s position, which is more broadly shared than many will publicly
acknowledge, at least as they apply for grants from the National Science Foundation, is
that the failure to make more progress developing a predictive or explanatory agenda
should not be held against us, and in fact he suggests that it might have been detrimental
had we been more successful: business students and the military would just have misused
the knowledge. 3 Message to world: leave us be to develop our aesthetically pleasing
models. This position is remarkably similar to those of cultural anthropologists or
sociologists who characterize their work as interpretive rather than explanatory, and
finesse questions about the extent to which their propositions are falsifiable. If none of
the propositions we are advancing in the different disciplines can be disproved, it is a
waste of time talking about unifying the social sciences, because none of us is doing
science.
Not everyone is satisfied with the proposition that we have no responsibility to develop
models or tools that can predict or explain human behavior, and many genuinely want to
try and improve upon the current situation. It is one thing, however, to call for the
unification of the social sciences, quite another (and far more difficult) to take real steps
in that direction. The majority of scholars, particularly before receiving tenure, remain
within disciplinary bailiwicks, continuing along well established paths. But a minority,
frustrated with the inability of prevailing theoretical frameworks to explain anomalous
data, or in some cases the imperviousness of such frameworks to any imaginable data,
venture into new territory.
2

The focus here is on game theory and microeconomics. Macroeconomics, despite the disdain often
visited upon it by micro theorists, and despite the inroads of abstract highly technical modeling, has, in my
view, been more progressive in recent decades as a scientific endeavor, principally because explanation,
prediction, and data have mattered more.
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Here is exactly what he says: “…I am not sure applicability is desirable. If microeconomics is useful,
the first to benefit will be the MBA students who are among the last people in the world I feel obliged to
assist. If game theory were indeed useful it could be used for military purposes” (2001, p. 617).
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Often, however, the result is something akin to religious conversion: explorers embrace
the intellectual framework of another discipline uncritically, with recent converts
becoming even more fervent advocates than long time residents. Because of the history
of balkanization, there is no disciplinary tradition that does not currently suffer from
some form of intellectual pathology, and it’s a difficult matter, from an internal or an
external perspective, to separate diseased from healthy tissue. But it’s naïve to think such
segregation is any less important in areas outside of one’s own. A good rule of thumb for
adventurers is this: conditions in other regions are likely to be as complex and disordered
as those domestically. This should not discourage exploration. But embracing without
critical examination work in other disciplines can be as unproductive as simply ignoring
it. This is true for those moving in either direction between the two main social scientific
traditions: the economic/rational choice and the traditional sociological/anthropological
approach.
The reality is that data and concepts useful for building a general framework for
understanding human behavior are scattered throughout the social, behavioral, and
natural sciences. But there is also a lot of chaff, often protected by the stiff tariffs that
discourage integrative or cross-disciplinary work. Separating or distilling what is useful
from what is not is challenging. As we push forward we need scholars who understand
the limitations and strengths of their own tradition, and are also prepared to search out
and identify the limitations and strengths in others.
Hodgson’s book is principally concerned with variation over time in a region’s
institutional structures and the consequences of such variation for behavior within them,
and with intellectual attempts to deal with this issue. If one wants to move beyond
consideration of consequences to a more general theory addressing both commonalities
of human institutions and their variation, one is drawn, almost inevitably, to
consideration of the influences on behavior of our biology and evolutionary history. This
helps explain why, to the degree that this book moves beyond intellectual history, it is as
much about biology as it is about history. Hodgson’s appeal to reintroduce a serious
interest in biological influences on human behavior is welcome (and consistent with some
of his earlier work), but weak on specifics or serious critical treatment of the crosscurrents in evolutionary thinking that would be necessary to implement this.
Strengths and Limitations of Institutionalism
We must begin, of course, by understanding the strengths and limitations of our own
approach. If we are to make progress, it is necessary to examine carefully the
institutionalist position, to view it not just as a battering ram with which to inflict damage
on currently prevailing orthodoxies, but to identify the strengths and weaknesses in its
current incarnations. In doing so, we must be critical as well as constructive.
Hodgson asks rhetorically if we need different models or theories to understand different
societies in different historical epochs. His is, as suggested, a rhetorical question,
preparing the ground in this case for an affirmative answer, one with which many readers
of his book will be inclined to agree. But there is a strong case that this initial and
fundamental question should be answered in the negative, and indeed has to be answered
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in the negative, if we are serious about integrating the social and behavioral sciences in a
way that will foster a progressive scientific enterprise. The case for this position does not,
however, involve embracing rational choice models based on the assumption that human
preferences are stable, transitive, and narrowly selfish. 4 Such models predict that
humans will operate in all spheres so as efficiently to advance their material self interest.
This approach is inadequate as a foundation for addressing the political and cultural
variables that define the arena within which we economize, or operate according to the
counsel of our foraging algorithms (Field, 2001).
Our biological hardware is basically unchanged from what it was 12,000 years ago, at the
start of the Neolithic transition. Any model that purports to explain or predict how people
behave must come to terms with the fact that across cultures today, or across time in
history, groups of human actors are virtually identical in their species typical
characteristics. My point is not to deny variation in individual biological and cognitive
characteristics, but to emphasize that variation among group averages is relatively
insignificant, and certainly too small to account for the types of differences in behavior
with which Hodgson is concerned.
We are, of course, more than our biology. Then, as now, we possess evolved capabilities
to learn by direct observation reinforced by instruction and imitation of others. We are
not blank slates: this learning has biases, in the sense that we learn more easily in certain
directions than in others. These differential predispositions, the consequence of
evolutionary influences on our genetic heritage, have been most clearly demonstrated in
language acquisition, but it is true as well of how we learn to interact with other humans.
These biases nevertheless allow a great deal of flexibility. Ultimately it is what we and
our forebears have done with this capability that distinguishes us from our neolithic
ancestors, and distinguishes denizens of technologically advanced societies from huntergatherer groups.
Learning can affect not only the means we use but also to some degree the ends we deem
important. Parents are remarkably successful in passing on to their children not only
language vocabularies and recipes for making cake (transforming inputs into outputs), but
also religious beliefs and ethical principles. Infantrymen are routinely trained to throw
themselves on a grenade to protect other members of their squad. And organized
political forces in the Middle East have been able to motivate substantial numbers of
individuals to act as suicide bombers. The latter two instances are particularly stark
examples of individuals expressing behaviors which, from a narrowly selfish perspective,
are strictly dominated strategies. Contrary to those who insist that preferences are strictly
exogenous and not to be disputed, human goals can to some degree be influenced. This is
particularly relevant in considering political behavior, which extends beyond realms such
as electoral politics to economic interactions which often also have a political component
(the main exceptions are those mediated by purely competitive markets).
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In a typology of rational choice approaches developed below, I distinguish this type of models from
approaches that involve less restrictive assumptions about human goals.
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The partial programmability of human cognitive processes and behavioral inclinations
has made possible variations in human culture, which in turn help account for behavioral
differences beyond those that can be swept back to differences in the non-human
environment. A large part of anthropology has been devoted to documenting cultural
influences on human behavior distinguishable from those of the non-human environment.
Traditional anthropologists, sociologists and institutional economists have correctly
rejected as a methodologically individualist fallacy the claim that we can understand
everything about a society by considering the characteristics of just one individual
human. Thus, Hodgson is absolutely right that “institutions are not simply human nature
writ large” (p. 269).
Nevertheless, culture and social structure are not superorganic forces with powers or
influence or dynamics ultimately irreducible to aggregated characteristics of individuals,
in particular beliefs about how the world works, who is friend and who is foe, who
deserves deference and who does not, and what are the desirable ends of human activity.
Methodological individualism has been a traditional bête noire of institutionalist
economics. While the institutionalist critique of economic and rational choice theory as it
is commonly practiced has much to recommend it, we will make no scientific progress if
we go the superorganic route and mystify culture, social structure, or institutions.
Institutionalists need to make peace with the principle of methodological individualism,
cease the unending critiques of reductionism, at the same time rejecting a version of
methodological individualism that is not sustainable while working to develop and
advance one that is. Granted, we cannot hope to understand human behavior by studying
the characteristics of a single individual. But we can hope to do so by studying the
aggregated characteristics of groups of individuals.
Institutions are not human nature writ large. But species typical behavioral
predispositions – human universals – do govern and restrain the range of social variation.
All known human groupings proscribe incest, murder within the group, and excessive
within-group lying and cheating. It is of course possible that these outcomes reflect
independently arrived at cultural solutions to universal challenges of coping with other
closely affiliated conspecifics (members of the same species). But precisely because
these challenges are universal and recurring, it is likely that the behavioral inclinations
that support them have a biological and genetic substrate.
It is also likely, given what we observe in closely related species such as chimpanzees,
that humans have biologically conditioned inclinations both to dominate other
conspecifics, and to submit to those dominant, as well as more egalitarian tendencies that
lie at the foundation of our ability to sustain democratic societies and collectively restrain
would be dictators. These different and sometimes opposed impulses make human nature
contradictory and human individuals ambivalent about their behavior, but they are the
raw material from which we have fashioned a variety of political cultures. Variation in
institutions, which I take to be formal descriptions of rules governing human interactions,
are a reflection of political cultures which have varied considerably across groups and
over time.
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Hodgson argues, and I would agree with him, that individuals embedded in different
cultures organized by different institutions will behave differently, above and beyond the
differences that can be attributed to variations in the nonhuman environment. But the
influence of culture or formal institutions (I do not suggest that they are coextensive)
needs to be understood with reference to the aggregated characteristics of those whose
behavior they influence. We cannot make progress by suggesting that these forces
operate at some higher level still, and that we need entirely different models to
understand behavior in different cultural milieus. Cultural variations represent
differences in the patterns that emerge from aggregation of the beliefs (about states of the
world and desirable ends of human activity) of individuals who comprise a group. They
represent different parameter values in what must eventually be seen as a general model
of human behavior.
The fundamental position of the “old” institutional economics, of which I take Hodgson
to be a proponent, is that institutional variation, like the cultural variation in which it is
embedded, influences human behavior in ways that cannot be swept back to variation in
the non-human environment. I fully endorse this position, but the most interesting
current work reflecting this point of view is not being carried forward by people who call
themselves institutional economists. It moves forward under such banners as mechanism
design, or among those formulating tax or regulatory policy, or among advisors to
transition economies, which have proved to be real life laboratories for studying the
consequences of major variation in rules. Here we find practical applications of
institutional economics, but it is perhaps telling that so little of this work is today called
by this name.
If institutional economists wish to have a significant impact on public policy, as did John
Commons, they should be at the forefront of discussions of regulatory policy, or how to
design spectrum auctions, or what kind of legal system would best serve a transition
economy. If, on the other hand, institutional economics has larger ambitions to serve as a
launching pad for integration of the social sciences, then it needs to move beyond its
current niche habitat (largely backward looking intellectual history) and participate in a
broader scientific effort to bring the social, behavioral, and historical sciences together
using an approach that integrates findings from the biological and related sciences as well
as evolutionary theory.
This appears to be Hodgson’s aspiration, and indeed one of the more provocative parts of
the book is his discussion of how institutional economists gradually abandoned Veblen’s
interest in a Jamesian human psychology that recognized instincts (even if we don’t call
them that today) and the often contradictory impulses that influence human behavior
(“the original foundations of institutionalism, in Darwinism and instinct psychology,
were removed” (p. 181). Still, I think Hodgson exaggerates here. He has made a case that
Veblen embraced these views, but it’s not at all clear that many in the German historical
school, or other American institutionalists, such as Commons, did.
Whatever may have been the degree of interest of early institutional economists in
psychology, if we are serious about bringing biology back into the social sciences, and
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consider evolution not just as a metaphor for the differential survivability of firms or
technology, it is desirable that, as economists, we educate ourselves about debates within
evolutionary theory, most particularly those surrounding multilevel selection (Wilson and
Sober 1994, Sober and Wilson 1998, Boehm, 1999, Field, 2001). Understanding what’s
at stake here is essential if we wish critically to evaluate work that has been done in the
past quarter century in such areas as sociobiology or evolutionary psychology. There is
much to learn from reading these literatures, but it is a mistake to suspend critical
judgment in a headlong rush to embrace them. Institutions, however we agree to define
them, are a subset of culture, and developing a clear understanding of the ways in which
biology does and does not limit cultural variation and political behavior is essential in
piecing together a framework for understanding human action that integrates genetic,
cultural, and environmental influences.
Although I would expect Hodgson to be sympathetic towards such a program, he has not
seriously engaged the literatures necessary in order to carry this forward. This leads me
to question whether intellectual history of this sort, which sometimes (although less
frequently here than in other work in this genre) bogs down in the reification and
subsequent manipulation of concepts and ideas, can serve as a foundation for the kind of
focused discourse necessary to overcome the isolation and fragmentation of the
disciplines and subdisciplines. Relatively successful as intellectual history, this book is
disappointing as a contribution to social or behavioral science.
If we are to make progress in understanding and explaining human behavior, we need a
general theoretical approach which is capable of handling the variety of conditions under
which humans do and have lived. Since we are partially programmable, such a model or
theoretical approach will make different predictions depending on differences in the
parameter values assumed. There is more at stake here than semantic differences over
what we mean by the word “different.”
The Central Appeal of Institutionalism
No social scientist can deny that taking a broad view of history and geography, humans
exhibit and have exhibited an enormous variation in their social organization and the
level of technological proficiency that has undergirded their material standard of living.
If we step back from this variation and think in very general terms, there are ultimately
three types of explanations for why this variation exists: a) it reflects systematic genetic
differences among different human groups, b) it is the result of different but rational
responses to varying environmental conditions, and c) it reflects variation in culture.
A variety of evidence suggests that the first type of model cannot provide us much
traction. Although there are significant genetically determined phenotypical differences
influencing physical appearance, cognitive abilities, and behavior within any group of
humans, the systematic differences among groups are relatively small. It is quite unlikely
that these differences can have had more than a small impact on observed cross sectional
socio-economic variation among groups. Secondly, if we consider the historical
evolution of human groups, it is also quite unlikely that there has been very much genetic

8

evolution affecting significant species typical behavioral or cognitive traits since the
Neolithic revolution.
There has been some. The most well documented is the evolution of lactose tolerance
among populations with a pastoral or dairying tradition (most adult humans, like most
other mature mammals, cannot digest dairy products). These variations among groups
would, since they are the consequence of dependence on dairying, have to have arisen
subsequent to the agricultural revolution. Another often mentioned case involves the
high frequencies of genes predisposing to sickle cell anemia in populations of African
descent. The relevant gene in its homozygous form causes the debilitating disease but in
its heterozygous form provides resistance to malaria. Because of its fitness enhancing
effect in regions prone to malaria, natural selection has led to increases in gene
frequencies in populations long resident in such regions, whereas obviously selection in
malaria free zones has not permitted these genes to gain much of a foothold.
What is perhaps striking about these instances, however, is that they very nearly exhaust
the set of well documented cases of recent environmental influences on the genetic
composition of human groups.
An inescapable question is whether it is possible that there have been others of greater
behavioral significance. Could it be, for example, that populations with a tradition of
technological innovativeness have coevolved cognitive adaptations that make them more
facile, on average, at navigating within such environments? One reason for doubting
that this has been true, aside from the relatively small differences between measurements
of average group IQs, is that within modern societies, those with the greatest command
and proficiency with technologies have tended to have high income, wealth, or
socioeconomic status. In country after country these variables have also tended to
correlate with lower fertility, a maladaptive behavior with respect to natural selection and
reproductive fitness, but one that would have acted against gene culture coevolution in
this direction.
Until the 1930s hunter-gatherer societies existed in the interior of New Guinea
completely isolated from any form of contact with more technologically advanced
civilizations. Denizens of these cultures experienced relatively little difficulty
communicating with intruders at first contact and have been successful at quickly
learning how to operate the tools and technologies they brought with them. In sum, it is
unlikely that there are or have been significant genetic variations among groups of
humans that can account for observed differences in social organization and material
standards of living (see Lynn and Vanhanen 2002 for contrary arguments).
The second general type of explanation focuses on environmental influences, a broad
category into which is often put such obvious factors as temperature and rainfall, soil, and
natural resources, but which can also be understood to encompass technological
availabilities. There is little question that some of the differences we observe in social
organization and material culture reflect responses to different environmental conditions.
and it has been the dream of many that this mechanism could effectively deal with the
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problem that observed variation in rule structures appears to pose for a general theory.
One sees variants of this approach in the structural-functional tradition in sociology and
anthropology as well as within economics, especially among early proponents of the
“new” institutional economics (North and Thomas, 1973; Field, 1981).
If institutions and social structure were entirely the result of variation in climate or
geography, which are almost entirely independent of the history of human cognition and
endeavor, then we could legitimately view them as epiphenomenal – ultimately derivative
of more fundamental givens. A passing acquaintance with historical and geographical
variation reveals that such a conclusion is unjustified. Institutions and social structure
often vary where environmental and technological conditions are quite similar, and
sometimes remain unchanged in the face of substantial alterations in environmental
conditions (Field, 1991).
It is this reality that poses the stumbling block to a theory of social and institutional
variation that tries to explain such diversity entirely with reference to environmental
factors. And it is this reality that draws thoughtful scholars again and again back to the
traditions of the “old” institutionalism, of which Hodgson is an exponent, as well as to
the efforts of traditional sociology and anthropology. The strength of the old
institutionalism is that it acknowledges this reality: institutional/cultural/social structural
variation influences human behavior in ways beyond what can be swept back to
environmental differences.
I distinguish here between the old institutionalism, which focused on exploring the
consequences of institutional variation, and the “new institutionalism,” which, at least
initially, tried to endogenize such variation. The drive to endogenize had both rational
choice and Marxian variants, but in both instances the result has been to minimize the
degree to which cultural or institutional differences could influence behavior in ways
independent of the effect of variations in the nonhuman environment.
The characteristics (including beliefs and behavioral inclinations) of those other humans
with whom one interacts, can of course also be considered part of one’s environment,
broadly considered It is also true that such non-human factors as climate and the current
level of technological availabilities can and have been influenced by past human activity.
But it is conventional, and I believe useful, to distinguish cultural from environmental
explanations of behavior in this way: cultural explanations are those that attribute
behavioral variations to variations in the aggregated characteristics (beliefs and
behavioral predispositions) of the group in which an actor is embedded.
There are many definitions of institutions, but I understand them here to be formal rules
governing human interactions. 5 Institutions are reflective of and part of the broader
category of culture. Some aspects of culture reside or are embodied in artifacts and
5

The distinction between formal and informal rules is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. If I go to coffee with
you for the first time at 3 PM today, it is certainly not an institution. If I do it tomorrow, is it? There is no
hard and fast line where such a regularity of behavior, reinforced by mutually realized expectations,
“becomes” an institution.
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written materials. But the central core of what we mean by culture are the beliefs and
behavioral inclinations encoded in human brains as the result of teaching, imitation, and
observation. Culture is neither more nor less than the aggregation of these encoded
associations and beliefs, supplemented by external information storage devices such as
stone tablets, books, or hard drives, or other artifacts including tools or structures.
The limitations of both institutional economics and the more orthodox traditions it
frequently opposes are the result of continuing to act out a larger drama within the social
and behavioral sciences whose basic themes are no different from what they were thirty
or even one hundred years ago. On the one hand we have those who combine the basic
principle of rational choice theory (maximization of utility functions reflecting stable and
transitive preferences) with the additional restriction that these preferences are selfish in
an attempt to construct an all embracing theory of human behavior. On the other hand
we have institutionalists who, along with traditional sociologists and anthropologists,
emphasize an independent causal impact for such concepts as culture, norms, social
structure or, in this case, institutions. 6 The organizing principle of the former tradition
has been methodological individualism, whereas for the latter it has been opposition to
attempts to reduce or trace back the content of norms and social structure to
characteristics of the individuals whose activity they influence or organize.
This play has been performed again and again, and both sets of actors have some good
lines. The economic/rational choice defense of the principle of methodological
individualism has merit, although this is not true of all versions of it. A sophisticated
defense cannot claim that the current behavior or the past evolution of a unit can always
be understood with reference only to the properties of the individual unit itself. It can
claim, however that the behavior of the members of a group is ultimately explicable with
reference to the non-human environment along with the aggregated characteristics of its
individual members. What else, after all, can there be?
The institutionalist tradition, on the other hand, correctly stresses the large number of
empirical and historical phenomenon that cannot be accounted for by rational choice
models if they are coupled, as they so often are, with the assumption of selfishness in all
spheres (people act so as efficiently to advance their material welfare). But the defense of
such concepts as culture and social structure as supraindividual does not follow.
Rational choice models assuming stable, transistive, and narrowly selfish preferences
cannot explain a broad range of important phenomenon, from voting to the sacrifices
parents make for their children, to our ability to overcome free rider problems and initiate
cooperate activity in small groups. The problem with the institutionalist critique,
however, is that it has bought into a long tradition with firm roots in sociology and
anthropology that really doesn’t take issue with the assumptions about innate human
psychology typically made by those operating within the rational choice traditions. It
6

Independent in the sense that they are predetermined variables, and moveover that this predetermination
does not result from a simple mapping from features of the non-human environment or available
technologies. At some level of remove, of course, there is a path dependent history that has led the culture
of a group or region to be what it is.
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simply assumes that culture and civilization restrain these baser impulses, thus
explaining all the phenomenon that the rational choice tradition is unable to account for.
Having made this point, institutionalists then repeatedly criticize rational choice theorists
for failing to acknowledge it. But for many, the critique is like water off the back of a
duck, because the claims and the explanatory framework seem so egregiously to violate
the principles of methodological individualism.
We cannot treat the “culture” and norms that enabled small groups of non-kin to form
initially as a deus ex machina. “Culture” could not always have existed to restrain the
otherwise disastrous outcomes that our innate psychological predispositions would
apparently have lead us to. The persistent emphasis on the primacy of culture is to me
reminiscent of the story of the person who interrupts the distinguished lecturer to explain
that he is clearly unaware of the fact that the earth is a large plate sitting atop a giant
turtle. When the surprised scientist asks what the turtle sits atop, the member of the
audience harrumphs, clearly irritated at the ignorance of this supposed expert, and replies
that, of course, it’s turtles all the way down.
The solution to this origin problem is to acknowledge that our innate psychology is not as
unremittingly nasty and brutish as Hobbes would have it. Our innate psychology enables,
and initially enabled cooperation in small groups of 30 to 100 beyond what can be
explained as the consequence of kin selection. The predispositions that make up our
innate psychology, moreover, are the result in part of evolutionary processes that
involved selection at multiple levels, including levels above the individual organism.
None of this is inconsistent with the gene level perspective that has now, appropriately,
come to dominate evolutionary theory.
Tocqueville saw small groups as natural, and in this he was correct: they form because
we are inclined to form them. We are inclined to refrain from harm even when the logic
of the one shot Prisoner’s Dilemma is indisputable. And we are inclined to retaliate when
wronged, or when a group norm is violated, even when it may not be in our material
interest to do so. These traits could not have been favored initially by individual
organism level selection: but groups that had more individuals so inclined tended to
grow faster, and under the right demographic conditions, although such traits were
shrinking in frequency at all times in every group within the population, they increased in
the population at large.
Institutional economics must let go of the comfortable critique of rational choice theorists
as “reductionist.” There is nothing wrong with criticizing rational choice models when
they explain or predict poorly. But it is too easy simply to damn analysis as reductionist.
Good science requires that we try and break down a phenomenon into its constituent
parts. Where we confront limitations due to deficiencies in our current level of scientific
knowledge there is justification for conducting analysis at a higher level. But absent such
limitations, we should proceed. The problem is not that the rational choice tradition
champions methodological individualism. The problem is that it so often, explicitly or
implicitly, couples the assumption of stable and transitive preferences with that of
selfishness. These type of models don’t simply say that people act in satisfaction of their
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desires. They don’t simply say that preferences are stable, transitive, and perhaps
monotonic. By assuming narrowly selfish preferences they predict that people act in all
instances so as to advance their material well being. Although true in many contexts, it is
not so in all, as an important range of experimental and observational data makes clear.
Standard microeconomics is the study of the operation of foraging algorithms in an
environment never anticipated by the forces of natural selection that refined them.
Constrained maximization tools work relatively well in modeling the operation of such
algorithms. But our evolutionary history has endowed us with other algorithms that also
facilitate our survival and are particularly important in conditioning political behavior.
These include a willingness some of the time to play a strictly dominated strategy in a
one shot PD, such that cooperative and potentially repeated interactions among non-kin
can begin, a willingness, once continuing interaction has begun, to devote inordinate
amounts of energy to detecting rule violators, an obsession that can distort our ability to
think logically (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992), and a willingness to engage in costly
punishment of those identified as defectors (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Rational choice
theory puts itself in a box if it assumes that our behavior is driven exclusively by our
foraging algorithms.
It is our biologically mediated behavioral inclinations that, in the first instance, enable
reciprocity and cooperation among non-kin in small groups, not the “invention” of
culture. Once we move beyond small groups, the norms, expectations, institutions and
rules that emerge or that we construct are essential in allowing the operation of larger
organizations and states. But these cultural or institutional innovations are built upon a
biological substrate.
Until this argument is fully engaged the traditions of institutional economics and its
cousins in disciplines outside of economics will continue to participate in a pointless and
increasingly stale methodenstreit that will not advance our understanding of human
behavior.
Endogenous Institutions
There is a long tradition running from technologically determinist passages in Karl Marx
to early new institutional history writings of Douglass North that suggests that institutions
and, perforce, culture, are ultimately epiphenomenal: reflective of more fundamental
givens such as resource endowments and technologies. Thus, in a perhaps bowdlerized
version of Marx, the handmill gives you the feudal landlord, the steam mill the industrial
capitalist. In the early Northian version, “efficient” institutions arise because they offer a
free lunch in comparison to the alternatives: someone can be made better off without
making anyone else worse off, so an old rule is discarded, and a new one brought in. The
triggers are assumed to be changes in land-labor ratios or available technologies. In both
of these frameworks institutional variation is a surface phenomenon, to be studied as
confirmation of the operation of more fundamental forces, but without much independent
influence itself.
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The more recent writings of North represent an important about-face on this issue. First
of all, he now acknowledges that simply because a different institution might by KaldorHicks efficient, in the sense that winners could in principle compensate losers and still be
better off, there might not always be mechanisms that would automatically (and
costlessly) arise for effectuating that transfer. Thus inefficient institutions might persist.
If one adds to this the possibility that there could be multiple efficient institutions for a
society with given technologies and preferences depending on how endowments were
initially distributed, it begins to be clear that there is a potentially broad range of rules
that might characterize a region with given resources and access to a particular set of
technologies.
Moreover, North now acknowledges the influence on behavior of ideology and norms.
What this represents is recognition that individuals may not be driven solely by wealth
maximization, and that deviations from this assumption may go beyond simply variation
in preferences for leisure vs. material goods. The net effect of these alterations is to
reinforce the conclusion that institutions or rules may differ across space and time where
resources and technologies are similar, but may also be similar across space and time
when resources and technologies differ or change (Field, 1991). Rule variation,
therefore, can be consequential, which was, of course, the central organizing principle of
the old institutionalism.
This intellectual move away from the more extravagant claims of the early new
institutionalism is mirrored within literatures attempting to understand biological
influences on behavior. In the 1970s, sociobiologists moved aggressively to explain all
human behavior as the consequence of inclinations favored evolutionarily by fitness
maximization (Wilson, 1978). Sociobiological explanation is not in principle the same as
rational choice theory assuming stable, transitive and narrowly selfish preferences. In the
latter framework individual organisms act so as to maximize their own material welfare.
In the former natural selection favors genes that predispose to behavior by the organisms
containing them that leads to increases in the frequency of such genes in future
generations. But if gene interest is assumed more or less coextensive with organism
interest, and if selection is assumed to operate at levels no higher than that of the
organism, then the conclusions reached about human behavior are very similar – thus
apparently providing such rational choice models with a biological underpinning.
There is now, however, greater acknowledgement that much human behavior in our
current environment is simply maladaptive. Evolutionary biologists such as Cosmides
and Tooby view our inclinations as having been honed in a two million year Pleistocene;
in some cases the behavioral inclinations selected may not be fitness enhancing in the
current environment because of the relatively slow pace of genetic evolution in humans.
In other instances cultural and technological changes may have enabled and reinforced
maladaptive behavior, such as fertility control. The acceptance of both of these
propositions represents a step forward from 1970s sociobiology, but also represents, as in
the case of the new institutionalism, some dulling of its apparently revolutionary
implications. What still remains very controversial is the proposition that some
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genetically influenced behaviors that continue in large measure to be adaptive were
originally selected for at levels above the level of the organism.
Among mainstream economists today (2003) it is much more widely accepted than was
true fifteen years ago that institutional, cultural, and other normative features of
economies can vary in ways that have profound influences on economic outcomes, that
these rules are human creations, sometimes planned and thus the subject of political
choice, that it makes a great deal of difference whether we get them “right” and that this
won’t automatically happen. The examples of the different growth trajectories and
environmental records of East and West Germany before reunification, or North and
South Korea are obvious examples, but economic history provides many more, from the
economic consequences of slavery in the American South, to the possible influence of
different legal traditions on the structure of financial systems in common law and civil
law countries (LaPorta et al., 1998). Thus, with the partial retreat of the “new”
institutionalism, the fundamental insight of the old institutionalism has been reaffirmed.
Institutional economists about whom Hodgson writes viewed it as important to describe
the rules – legal and otherwise -- within which economic activity took place. The key
institutional issue in economics thirty years ago was whether, in thinking about static
general equilibrium analysis, there were three categories of predetermined variables
(tastes, technologies, and endowments), or whether there was also a fourth (rules) (see
Field, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1991). Mainstream economists and game theorists did not speak
with one voice on this issue, some readily granting the influence of institutional variation
on outcomes, others, in a number of traditions, claiming that they were epiphenomenal
and could be swept back in an explanatory sense to the more basic triad of tastes,
technology and endowments.
The waters were muddied by the proclamations of the new institutional economics. The
new institutional economics promised that it would give institutions their due, but not in
the fuddy – duddy tradition of Commons, Mitchell, or the German Historical school. On
the one hand, there was a drive ultimately to eliminate the role of rules as an independent
influence on outcomes. On the other hand there was an intent to work out the
implications of the Coase theorem writ large. The Coase theorem stated that in the
absence of transactions costs rule structures would not affect the sectoral allocation of
inputs; in that sense they would not matter. In the presence of transactions costs,
however, some rules might be more efficient that others; the new institutional economics
would use these principles to explain why we have the rules that we do.
By the early 1990s the new institutional economics had run into some explanatory brick
walls that caused its leading practitioners to back away from some of its early objectives.
In particular, as noted, scholars such as North began talking about the role of ideology
and the possibility of the persistence of inefficient rules. But once one allows for this, it
is clear that rules can have independent influences. Moreover, it is no longer obvious
what are the distinguishing feature of the new institutional economics. Currently, it
seems to be the use of the analytical tools and vocabulary of game theory to analyze or
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interpret historical institutional arrangements. This is a considerably more modest
enterprise, and it is much less clear that the propositions advanced are falsifiable.
Hodgson and I are in broad agreement that history matters and that, because this leads to
institutional variation that at any moment of time is not epiphenomenal, institutions
matter. Where we may differ is on where we should go from here. Suppose we consider
the issue of static allocation that dominated much of economic theory at least through the
1970s. I have argued in a series of papers that if we wish to construct general
equilibrium models, it is important to acknowledge a fourth category of predetermined
variable beyond technologies, endowments, and preferences. This category can be called
culture, norms, or institutions. Whatever we call it, it consists of beliefs, not just about
how the non-human world works (we can think of this as technology), but how other
humans will act or react, and to some degree, what are the appropriate ends of human
activity (thus these beliefs shade over into preferences).
If we grant this perspective, however, is it helpful to say we need a different theory to
analyze static allocation in North as opposed to South Korea, or are we rather talking
about the same general theory with different parameter values? We need to be precise,
and Hodgson is looser than I would prefer in his use of the term theory, sometimes
speaking of it as simply a set of concepts or categories (for example in discussing why
empirical observation must be “theory laden”), while at other times suggesting that the
term necessarily implies some positing of causal relationships among these categories.
While a number of economists have recently tried to build rational choice models
incorporating the influences of social norms (e.g, Akerlof, 1980; Kevane and Wydick,
2001), this leaves open the question of their analytical status. Can norms and institutions
truly be understood as forces external to the individual, like the weather? If they can be
viewed as external to an individual, can they also be viewed as external to the individuals
whose behavior they influence?
Economists have differed with respect to the analytical status of norms. Both Hodgson
and I have reacted to the limitations of economic or rational choice models as they in fact
confront us in much economic discourse. As an institutionalist, Hodgson has some
sympathy for the sociological, anthropological tradition of Durkheim and Malinowski,
with its emphasis on institutions and culture as superorganic, with dynamics of their own,
“independent” of the individual humans whose activity they organize. Hodgson
continues, I think, to embrace this distinctive tradition. My argument here is that we now
need to move beyond the correct claim that culture, norms, or institutions represent an
influence on behavior beyond those of technologies, endowments, and preferences, and
locate these norms and institutions in the aggregated characteristics of those individuals
whose behavior they influence, augmented to some degree by the physical environment
they create.
Rational choice models come in at least three canonical flavors, and it is important, in a
specific instance, to be aware of which versions we are dealing with. It is also important
to keep in mind that these models involve assumptions about cognition as well as goals
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and objectives; the term rationality can mean different things in the two spheres. My
emphasis in the trichotomy below focuses principally on behavior, as opposed to
cognitive aspects of rationality:
Rational choice models, Level 1: People act in satisfaction of their desires.
It is not worth spending a great deal of time on this variant, because there is no
conceivable empirical data that could refute it. Models based on this premise can’t be
rejected with observed behavior and it is pointless debating their scientific merits with
proponents.
Rational choice models, Level 2. People have preferences that are stable and transitive,
and act on the basis of these preferences.
Stability is based on the proposition that the basic goals of humans, like other living
organisms, display some time consistency. Transitivity is typically justified by appeal to
a money pump argument. The appeal of assuming that if an individual prefers A to B and
B to C, she will not prefer C to A is ultimately supported by an evolutionary claim:
individuals whose choices did not adhere to this rule would be subject to extinction
because one could suck all their wealth from them using a money pump. Suppose an
individual has revealed that she prefers A to B, B to C , and C to A. Start by giving her
C. She should then be willing to pay something to swap C for B, and something more to
swap B for A. But now we can ask her to pay a third time to swap A for C, having
induced her to make three successive payments to obtain what we originally gave her for
free! Presumably individuals with such preferences would be evolutionarily disfavored
A variant of Level 2 rational choice model building, attributable to Samuelson’s
influence, insists that preference structures be derived from observed behavior. If we add
to stability and transitivity the assumptions of convexity, monotonicity, reflexiveness and
completeness, then level 2 specifications are subject to empirical refutation through
demonstrated violations of the weak and strong axioms of revealed preference. For
example, a violation of the weak axiom of revealed preference occurs when an individual
chooses commodity bundle A when they could have chosen B, revealing a preference for
A over B but then, faced with a different budget constraint, chooses B when they could
have chosen A, apparently revealing a preference for B over A. The strong axiom is
violated if an individual indirectly reveals a preference for A over C (by first preferring A
to B and then B to C) and then reveals a preference for C over A.
Ideally, one could imagine rational choice methodology as a means for developing
predictive models of human behavior: extracting from the revealed preferences displayed
in observed behavior concise mathematical specifications of individual utility functions
that, when combined with the maintained hypothesis of maximization, enabled reliable
out of sample predictions. In practice, however, very little actual work has ever been
done along these lines. The most common use of the revealed preference methodology
has been to evaluate the welfare consequences of proposed policy interventions in an
ordinal sense (they will make people better off or worse off). I don’t mean to trivialize
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these conclusions which are sometimes not at all intuitive, but it would be a great stretch
of the imagination to claim that the principle of revealed preference has led to the
development of a robust methodology for predicting levels of human behavior.
In rational choice models, level 3, people are assumed to have stable, transitive and
narrowly selfish preferences which lead to behavior efficiently advancing the material
interest of the actor.
Level 3 models often use the assumption of wealth maximization as a practical means of
operationalizing selfishness. The distinction between level 2 and level 3 is the insistence
in the latter on the importance of assuming human selfishness and denial in the former
that this assumption has any necessary relation to the method (Gintis, 2003). In practice
the distinction is not quite so clear, because of the common assumption of monotonicity
in revealed preference exercises. If money is viewed as the generalized good,
monotonicity requires, everything else being equal, that more money is preferred to less.
Thus, experimental evidence indicating that under the right circumstances people will
persistently leave money on the table, while clearly an empirical refutation of level 3,
also poses some challenges to level 2.
So far I have said little about possible limitations on human cognition. Rational choice
models often dispose of the problem by assuming perfect information. Cognition is
costless, errorless, unbiased. The assumption of rational expectations is somewhat less
restrictive: it requires that people use all available information processed according to
the best available logical and statistical algorithms in forming their beliefs about the
world. The assumption is a bit more realistic because it acknowledges that some
information might not be available, and implicitly suggests another optimization problem
in the sense that more information could presumably be made available through the
expenditure of additional effort or resources.
If we take some version of level 2 as part of what is meant by traditional
microeconomics, do the deviations we need to accept in order to account for political
behavior lie only in the realm of cognition? That is, does human bounded rationality, to
use the term popularized by Herbert Simon, suffice to explain why humans behave
differently from what canonical versions of the theory predict? While it is of course true
that human cognition is imperfect in many ways, the answer to this question is negative.
This is my objection to the otherwise estimable work of scholars such as Elinor Ostrom:
she is too willing to attribute the behavioral deviation to the Simon tradition of bounded
rationality (Ostrom, 1998).
The human predisposition to play cooperate in a one shot PD, or make voluntary
contributions to public goods, or engage in costly punishment of norm violators, cannot
be swept back to some imperfection in cognitive capabilities. Before you can have the
parametric prices that confront choosers in intermediate theory textbooks you need trade,
and before trade you need relations of reciprocity among non-kin, and to get that you
need a human ability to overcome one shot PDs that must lie somewhere else than in our
predispositions for self preservation. I have described elsewhere how genes predisposing
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to such behavior can be favored by natural selection. Any understanding of who we are
and how our societies got to where we are needs to confront this argument, or else engage
in (invisible?) hand waving. The dream of deducing social organization from some
posited original state as the result of behavior by rationally choosing narrowly self
interested agents is a chimera. The basis of the appeal of the sociological and
anthropological tradition, with which the old institutional economics has many affinities,
has been that norms and institutions, externally posited and imposed, have seemed to
provide a resolution to a gaping lacuna in rational choice theory at least of the level 3
variety. But the development of culture presupposes continuing interaction among nonkin adults, leaving unanswered the question of how such interaction originates. It can’t be
turtles all the way down.
Practitioners of rational choice methodology, particularly economists, have been
ambivalent about cultural explanations of behavior and, perforce, those relying on
institutions. My proposal for a rapprochement is this: 1) those in the institutionalist traditional sociological/anthropological tradition accept a sophisticated version of
methodological individualism. 2) Those who find level 3 rational choice models
appealing abandon the insistence on strictly selfish preferences and the belief that natural
selection necessarily provides an underpinning for them. I have no illusions that
negotiating this Peace Plan will be any easier than solving the Israeli – Palestinian
conflict, but I would like to lay out the logic for it.
The vision I have for understanding both the universal and variable features of human
organization is explicitly biological and evolutionary, and not just evolutionary in a
metaphorical sense. Take as our starting point what we know about language. Two
salient features are worth noting. First, vocabularies very greatly across the world and
these differences are clearly learned cultural phenomena. Yet all of the roughly 5,000
known human languages obey a set of basic rules of grammatical structure that reflect
design features of human cognition. This may seem marvelous or difficult to accept at
first glance, but it is upon reflection no more surprising than that our genetic material also
includes detailed assembly functions for such differentiated organs as our liver or our
spleen. The design features means that with respect to learning of grammar we are
differentially predisposed at certain developmental stages to form certain associations.
If we grant that the vocabularies of language are cultural features, are we correct in
arguing that they are emergent properties, in the sense that they cannot be understood by
referring to the aggregated properties of those individuals whose communication they
organize? I think upon reflection, the answer must be negative. Language is based on a
set of reciprocal expectations of how others will interpret certain sounds I may make. I
would claim that language can be understood entirely with respect to properties of the
individuals whose intercourse it organizes: in particular learned and shared vocabularies
embedded within a universal and genetically based grammatical template.
Whereas it is not possible to comprehend a language by looking only at properties of one
particular individual whose communication it organizes, it is possible to say that
language is neither more nor less than the sum total within a group of shared expectations
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about the meaning of sounds that have been acquired through a process of association and
statistical learning. The particularities of a language (not the universal structure that is
shares with all others) are simply the set of those expectations among the members of the
collectivity whose behavior it facilitates.
We need to think about institutions and norms in the same way: the differences among
them reflect particular patterns of shared expectations about how others in the collectivity
will respond (positively and negatively) to different states of the world and in particular
specific individual actions. These are acquired through the standard techniques of
association and statistical learning stressed by behaviorists, although this acquisition is
attained within a framework of hard wired predispositions to learn in certain directions.
Language represents solution to a coordination problem: the selection of one from a
number of multiple possible equilibria. The achievement of a cooperative outcome in
what might be a one shot PD is a much greater challenge, because the only Nash
equilibrium in that game is inefficient. Political organization requires that people,
literally or figuratively, leave money on the table. They must be willing, initially, to play
a strictly dominated strategy.
The assumption of wealth maximization is a useful assumption in many contexts. What
is not reasonable, however, is the assumption that it prevails in all. History, experience,
and experimental evidence have documented that humans, even when they fully
understand the nature of the experiment or the situation the find themselves in, will
sometimes play strictly dominated strategies. This is true, for example, in one shot PDs,
in ultimatum games, or in multiplayer PD games involving the collective provision of
public goods and the opportunity for costly punishment of those who don’t contribute. It
is simply not possible to provide a rationale based on level 3 modeling for the play of a
strictly dominated strategy.
Sophisticated rational choice modelers, when called upon to defend rational choice
methodology, will almost invariably defend a version of Level 2, but in practice it is the
unrestrained application of level 3 methodology in areas where the evidence simply
won’t support it that has given rational choice modeling a bad name. Those who have
openly defended Level 3 methodology have often appealed to evolutionary arguments in
support of the assumptions of human selfishness. Humans are selfish because we have
inherited genes that so predispose us, and if our great grandparents had not had these
genes, we would not be here. The specter of Charles Darwin has always seemed to lurk
in the background for those who would challenge Level 3 models. On the other hand,
those who want to force Level 3 into every nook and cranny immediately run into
difficulties dealing with parental sacrifice for children. Most economists and biologists
now agree that the Hamilton kin selection mechanism adequately accounts for parental
sacrifice. But the logic of that mechanism requires acknowledgement that natural
selection doesn’t necessarily make humans individually selfish in all venues.
Natural selection will favor genes that predispose in favor of organism behavior that
results in higher frequencies of such genes in future generations. For humans, this often
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means predisposing in the direction of behaviors that do in fact efficiently advance the
material well being of the actor. But not always, as the example of parental sacrifice
indicates. The logic of multilevel selection models, necessary to account for the
predispositions that enable us to solve one shot PDs and the multiperson PDs implicit in
voluntary provision of public goods problems, necessitates special demographic
assumptions about population fragmentation and regrouping over time. But it relies on
the same principle: genes that influence the vessels containing them to act in ways that
foster higher rates of increase of these genes will be favored, whether or not this
influence is always in the best interest of the vessel.
Conclusion
The founding fathers of institutionalism were a disparate group with disparate interests
and perspectives, but they appear to have been motivated by two general goals. The first,
more activist and normative, was to provide policy recommendations as well as an
intellectual foundation for government intervention as a means of improving the
operation of a capitalist economy. The second was to use the positive insights of
institutionalism as a foundation for a more general theory of human behavior.
Part IV of Hodgson’s book is concerned with this second agenda, which has also formed
the focus of my essay. But parts I – III are about the history of ideas, which is reflective
of the emphasis on intellectual history which dominates institutional economics today.
These sections would serve as a good starting point for someone interested in an
intellectual and political history of institutionalism, both in Europe and the United States.
The scholarship here is generally solid, although some of the summary statements, sound
good until one deconstructs them. For example (p. 200), Hodgson describes how Lionel
Robbins and Parsons “carved up the social sciences: sociology was to be concerned with
the social determination of goals; economics with the study of the rational choice of
means to pursue these ends.” If they ever had an agreement, I don’t think Parsons got it
in writing, because I doubt Robbins was prepared to cede to Parsons the idea that human
goals were socially determined, nor have generations of subsequent economists, who
have had little truck with sociology, Parsonian or otherwise.
Another example: Hodgson says of Veblen that he “avoided the three reductionisms of
methodological collectivism, methodological individualism, and biological reductionism”
(p. 140). Relative to other work in this genre, Hodgson is restrained in the tendency to
reify concepts. But he does succumb now and then. If one is going to talk in these terms,
one needs very careful definition and analysis of what is meant – which is lacking here.
The claim that we need different theories of human behavior for different cultures,
Hodgson’s main theme throughout all four sections of the book, arguably turns on what
we mean by different. Since all human groups are remarkably similar from a biological
perspective, I question the desirability of rejecting the pursuit of a unified theory of
human behavior, and have outlined in this essay some of the directions in which we
might proceed in order to construct it. Perhaps institutionalism’s fate can be attributed in
part to a series of intellectual accidents, such as Marshall’s replacement by Pigou at
Cambridge. But certainly the power of institutionalist ideas, and the ability actually to
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make progress on the normative and positive agendas identified above have had
something to do with it.
The approach of the old institutionalism has not been wrong, but it has been limited,
because it hasn’t successfully explored the origins of institutions beyond making the
correct point that these variations in them can’t be entirely swept back to variations in the
non-human environment. Historical economics is the time series version of cultural
economics. Hodgson could equally well have asked how economics forgot culture, and
written an almost identical book on the problem of cultural specificity in social science.
The problems of and challenges facing institutionalism are cut from the same cloth as
those affecting traditional sociology and anthropology.
Many voices have been raised calling for the introduction of more institutionalist ideas in
the training of economists. A critic might ask why “the institutionalist propaganda that
has been prominent in the economic discussion of the past 15 years in this country, has
not been more productive of concrete works and changes in the curriculum of our
graduate schools.”
The last sentence might have been written recently, but in fact was penned in 1931
(Burns, 1931, p. 80). Almost three quarters of a century have now passed. The central
truths of institutional economics have not been lost. But those who call themselves
institutionalists have defined the field largely as backward looking intellectual history,
ceding the important policy arena to mechanism designers, those who write tax law, and
Jeff Sachs. These scholars, although not calling themselves institutionalists, are proving
to be the truer heirs of John Commons. As far as Veblen, well, he is sui generis, but if
institutionalism is to be a foundation for a broader unification of the social sciences, a
more systematic and critical treatment of biological and evolutionary theory along with
experimental evidence is needed than is here provided.
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